Satisfaction not Guaranteed - Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe by Alexander F. Wagner et al.
SATISFACTION NOT GUARANTEED -
INSTITUTIONS AND SATISFACTION WITH




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 910
CATEGORY 2: PUBLIC CHOICE
APRIL 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 910
SATISFACTION NOT GUARANTEED – 
INSTITUTIONS AND SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE
Abstract
What determines citizens’ satisfaction with the “constitution in operation”? We make two
contributions towards an answer to this important policy question. First, we place stronger
emphasis than existing studies on quantitative interpretations of the importance of different
factors. We use scenario analysis to show that a consensual system generally promotes
satisfaction, but affects different types of citizens differently. Second, we focus on informal
institutions and rules of the game in European societies. Corporatism and group membership
as a measure of social capital are good for satisfaction, and people who live in countries with
a high degree of income inequality tend to be less satisfied. The findings for trust and for the
rule of law are ambiguous.
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1  Introduction
In recent years, economists have expended considerable effort to make the notion of
“utility” or “well-being” operational. The happiness literature (see Frey and Stutzer
(2002) for a review) has related factors ranging from economic growth to religious beliefs
to happiness in life. By contrast, scholars interested in the political economy of
democracy still tend to compare countries on the basis of more or less objective
indicators of the degree of democracy. But quite obviously even countries that achieve
exactly the same democracy ranking in, say, the Freedom House index, will not offer the
same degree of satisfaction with the way democracy works to their citizens. Much as we
want to know what drives subjective perceptions of personal happiness in life, scholars
and policymakers should be interested in what drives subjective perceptions of
satisfaction with democracy (SWD). From a philosophical point of view, it would be
paradoxical, to say the least, to try to build democratic polities in a way that fits with
theory (the liberal democratic paradigm shaped by Western political thinkers since the
17
th century) but not with the people’s will.
A number of recent papers have focused on SWD and its determinants. We will
review some of them in more detail below. The literature suffers from three problems:
SWD is conceptualized too easily; certain factors, in particular informal rules of the game
in a society have not been considered as determinants of SWD; and the interaction of
individual-level factors and society-level institutions has not been interpreted
appropriately in quantitative terms. In this paper, we set out to deal with the second and
third problem, while we mainly leave it to other papers to explore theoretical problems
with the concept of SWD (Canache, Mondak et al. 2001). We will also have a little bit to4
say about the theoretical concept of SWD, but the character of the paper is strictly
empirical.
We quantify the impact of institutions and individual variables on satisfaction with
democracy as it is measured by Euro-Barometers, cross-national surveys in Western
Europe. Our main findings are the following: We reexamine the existing evidence for
consensus versus majoritarian systems in depth and find considerable differences for
different types of citizens. The resulting quantitative implications appear to have been
overlooked so far. The interaction of institutional and individual variables comes out as
quite important for policy decisions. Second, we provide what we believe to be the first
analysis of the role of informal institutions in determining SWD. We find that
corporatism together with a low degree of income inequality is good for satisfaction with
democracy, as is social capital (as measured by group memberships).  By contrast, the
evidence for the effect of trust and for the rule of law on satisfaction is mixed. 
These results lead us to conclusions about the nature of people’s expectations toward
democracy.  On the one hand, the path toward the liberal democratic ideal is acclaimed
by Europeans, who almost systematically support any move toward it.  On the other hand,
there is not “one best way” along this path, as the ‘meaning’ of democracy and
expectations toward democratic regimes may vary significantly between countries.
Section 2 derives the hypotheses.  Section 3 describes how we test the hypotheses and
discusses methodological issues.  Section 4 presents the main quantitative findings for a
few particularly interesting specifications, and Section 5 concludes.  
  5
2  Theoretical background
David Easton’s (1965; 1975) studies have served as a seminal work for the
understanding of political support.  Easton was the first to make the distinction between
objects of political support and types of political support.  Norris (1999) recently
extended Easton’s three-level analysis of these ‘objects’ into five: support for the political
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political
actors.
1  Empirical studies found evidence that the public actually makes clear distinction
between these levels.
We are interested in having a measure for the felt discrepancy between democratic
norms and the actual democratic process, and it seems that the SWD item in the
Eurobarometer and other surveys is the closest we can get to a measure for this at the
moment (Thomassen 1995). It measures the support for the “constitution in operation”
(Klingemann and Fuchs 1995). Still, it is problematic that scholars do not offer more in-
depth discussion of what the “constitution in operation” can mean in citizens’ minds, nor
of the extent to which the indicator measures the same thing across countries.  Indeed, the
key point to keep in mind about this indicator is the absence of an objective and/or clearly
identified reference object.  Unlike for the other “objects,” people differ not only in the
way they evaluate it, but also on what they evaluate.  People differ with respect to what
they have in mind when they think of democracy. 
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that critical observers (Canache, Mondak et
al. 2001) have found that what “satisfaction with democracy” measures is neither the
support for the idea of democracy (regime principles), nor the confidence in political6
institutions (regime institutions), nor the support for incumbents (political actors; see
Merkl (1988) and Dalton (1999)), nor purely system support (Harmel and Robertson
1986; McDonough, Barnes et al. 1986; Weil 1989; Fuchs 1993; Lockerbie 1993; Fuchs,
Guidorossi et al. 1995; Morlino and Tarchi 1996; Anderson and Guillory 1997;
Klingemann 1999).  
The bottom line is that in a sense, we are in a situation similar to other areas of
(economic) policymaking, for example in environmental policy where we sometimes
need to rely on contingent valuation, i.e. survey methods to calculate environmental
benefits: Is some number better than no number? This paper cannot resolve this
controversy. Some argue that the answer to this question is “no.” Canache et al. (2001)
suggest that researchers stop using the SWD item of the Eurobarometers altogether
because it is not clear what it measures. 
By contrast, we take the pragmatic view that the SWD item can act as a summary
indicator (Clarke, Dutt et al. 1993). Although it contains some ambiguity, that ambiguity
is acceptable. Nevertheless, we expect that “satisfaction with democracy” cannot but be
extremely hard to predict, since it is driven by individual interpretation on both sides of
the “discrepancy”: what democracy should look like, and the way it works.  We do not
aim to distinguish the different channels
2. What the approach does tell us is that in
addition to pragmatically controlling for individual level variables in our regressions, we
                                                                                                                                            
1 The typology runs from the most diffuse to the most specific support.
2 This would be very difficult or indeed just as impossible as deciphering whether a measured increased
risk appetite of investors stems from a decrease in risk, a change in the way people perceive risk, or a
decreased risk aversion. 7
also need to interpret their interaction with the institutional variables in a clearer fashion
than done so far in the literature (see below).
3  Hypotheses, data, and methodology
3.1  Hypotheses
Having accepted the SWD item as the most operational variable for support for the
constitution in operation, we can ask: What factors do we expect to play a role? Different
scholars have emphasized different factors at different times: democratic history and
political culture (Almond and Verba 1965; Inglehart 1997), formal democratic
institutions (Lijphart 1994; Anderson 1998; Lijphart 1999; Bowler and Donovan 2002),
political and economic performance (Lipset 1994; Anderson and Guillory 1997).  We use
a very simple theoretical logic to predict signs of our explanatory variables:
First, the worse off an individual is in terms of economic well-being and political
influence the less satisfied he will be with the way democracy works in his country. This
is almost self-evident and does not need much further theoretical explanation; for recent
evidence on the role of winning and losing in elections see Anderson and LoTempio
(2002). As a proxy for the position of an political-economic position of an individual in
society, we use NATIONAL, the perception of change in national economic performance
in the past 12 months, PERSONAL, the perception of change in personal economic
performance in the past 12 months, and LOSER, a dummy variable which indicates
whether the person had not voted for one of the parties which is now in the federal
government. In addition, we also use a vector of demographic variables to control for8
GENDER (sometimes), INTEREST (interest in politics), INCOME, AGE, and
EDUCATION. 
As a source for the demographic and economic variables, we use a series of
Eurobarometers. Although the results remain robust across several years (see the section
on robustness tests for more on this), in the tables presented in this paper, we focus on
purpose on the panel for fall 1990 (11 countries, about 1000 potential observations each).
There are two reasons to do this. First, it allows us to directly compare and contrast our
findings with those of Anderson and Guillory (1997). Second, the observations of many
of the institutional variables (like corporatism and trust) come from this period.
Second, we hypothesize that institutions that promote the amount and quality of
political participation increase SWD. For formal institutions, this idea has been discussed
and tested in the literature. The argument is that institutions like consensual democracy –
which is measured mostly with respect to the election system, a formal institution - allow
even those who voted for parties other than the government parties to be represented by
the system. Already Lijphart (1994) makes the point that consensual democracies
outperform majoritarian democracies in terms of responsiveness and do at least as well in
terms of efficiency, and thus lead to higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. To test
the role the consensuality of the system plays for different individuals, we present a
specification that closely follows the ideas of Anderson and Guillory (1997): Losers
should be less satisfied, but the higher the consensus orientation of a system is, the better9
losers are off. Winners, on the contrary, prefer a majoritorian system. This hypothesis can
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where CONSENSUS has an index i, but varies only across individuals in different
countries. To be consistent with our hyptoheses, we expect  0 2 > β , 0 3 > β , 0 1 > γ ,
0 2 > γ , 0 3 < γ , 0 1 > δ , 0 2 > δ , while the other variables are pure control variables
without any particular “story” associated with them.
The specification as such is not new. Our contribution here lies less with the
estimation of this equation as such, but rather with the evaluation of different scenarios. It
is surprising that most of the literature omits either individual or institutional variables
completely. Even when both are included in estimations, studies typically do not analyze
how the impact of certain institutions is in the presence of individual factors. For
example, it is true that Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that the “satisfaction gap”
between winners and losers of elections decreases along the majoritarian/consensual axis
created by Lijphart (1994). But they give no quantitative interpretation of which
conclusions hold for which parts of the population.
                                                
3 An alternative way is to run the model separately for losers and winners. The advantage of this is that
one can allow for different coefficients on the other variables. Our experiments with this approach and
evaluations with Clarify, the program provided by King et al. (2000), indicate that the quantitative results10
To our knowledge, there no study so far has considered the effect of institutional
variables other than the consensus/majoritorian system. This is quite surprising, since
there exists a wide variety of institutional and social indices which can be hypothesized to
be related to system support. We take institutions to broadly mean “rules of the game in a
society.”  Informal rules trust and social capital are supposed to favor satisfaction with
democracy because they allow conflicts to be solved more fairly and efficiently (for an
application of this idea in a different context see Schneider and Wagner (2001)).
In the present paper, we present and evaluate the results for a few particular
specifications:  First we introduce an indicator of corporatism (social partnership). The
social partnership index is the corporatism index of Tarantelli (1986), where corporatism
is defined as a system of societal structure which typically has a high degree of
centralization in wage bargaining, a high consensus orientation, and an active role of the
government in mediating social conflicts (each of these three elements is evaluated on a
scale of 4 to 5. The total score is the sum of the three elements and therefore ranges from
0 to 15)
4. This is the most formal of alternative institutions we consider.
In variants of this model, besides social partnership, we also consider the effects for
trust and group membership (both from Knack and Keefer (1997)), the gini index (i.e. the
                                                                                                                                            
for the institutional variables and our main findings for the different effects on different types of people do
not change. We therefore do not present them here.
4 For some regressions not further explored in this paper but shown in table 1 as regressions (3) and (4),
we also use an interaction term with LOSER for corporatism, on the same grounds as for consensus. Here,
we have also tried a centered interaction term, but the results were not suggestive of any additional insight
one might gain from this.11
index of income inequality from Deininger and Squire (1996), a factor that is often
categorized as being of institutional character because it contains a strong signal about
value judgements in a society), and the degree of the rule of law (from Wagner (2000)
who describes the primary sources). 
When we add these institutions to equation (1) above, we expect their coefficients to
reflect that more corporatism, greater trust, more widespread group membership, lower
inequality, and a better rule of law promote SWD.
3.2  Estimation technique and interpretation of the results
There are a number of issues related to the choice of estimation technique and the
interpretation of the results in order to get the most out of the available data. For the main
part of the paper, our dependent variable is a binary variable “Satisfaction” which is 1
when the respondent answered “Very satisfied” or “satisfied” to the question “How
satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” It is 0 if the
respondent said “Not satisfied” or “Not at all satisfied”. We use a probit estimation
procedure, implemented via maximum likelihood, to estimate the above equation
5.  
A technical issue also concerns the proper dealing with the panel data setup. In
particular, country fixed effects may play an important role. Including institutional
                                                
5 As almost always, experiments with logit estimation reveal that the quantitative interpretations do not
change. Since the original data is in ordered categorical format (4 categories), we have also explored what
happens when we use an ordered probit model. For space reasons – and because the results did not allow us
any particular additional insight – we decided to present our findings from the binary probit in the main part
of the paper. However, we do include a few figures based on the ordered probit without further comments
in the appendix to give the reader a taste of the results in this model.12
variables, which by definition don’t vary within a country without further controls may
lead to spurious results since this way one might just pick up some other fixed effect but
not the effect one wishes to examine. We have explored several possibilities to deal with
this issue. We use two complementary approaches here, which shed light on the questions
we are interested in. 
First, we run regressions controlling only for the individual level variables for each
country separately. We then do simulations (see below for an explanation) and plot
predicted probabilities of being satisfied against various institutional variables. 
Second, we only consider all observations in one panel but include institutions of
interest and a dummy variable for Italy which is clearly the (negative) outlier in terms of
satisfaction with democracy (depending on which observations are included,
approximately 25-35% of the people as opposed to more than 50-60% in other countries).
This allows us to control for the strongest country effect we detected. The advantage of
this approach, while not completely immune to the problem just discussed, is that we
have actual parameter estimates which can again be used in simulations to make more
substantive claims than through the analysis of the first approach. The section on
robustness tests reports what we have done to further explore the validity of the results. 
Through stacking all observations together and running a probit model over the whole
sample, we recognize that there may be other potential problems (bias, wrong standard
errors if the coefficients vary across individuals and countries, ignorance of the different
sample sizes due to deleted observations). An alternative is to specify a TS-CS-binary
model (where the “time” dimension here corresponds to the individuals). The results13
obtained with the STATA package suggest that neither the size of the coefficients nor the
standard errors are markedly different from the ones we get in our procedure. 
Finally, we break with the tradition of reporting only quite unintuitive “probit
coefficients.” While we have included a summary table containing “raw” estimation
results, we find that a better way to understand the implications of our models and the
uncertainty of the results is through statistical simulation. In particular, the usual
statement about the statistical significance of certain factors leaves the highly policy-
relevant question of the quantitative importance (i.e. the substantive significane) of the
effects unanswered. We follow King et al. (2000) here. For a description of the exact
procedure, we refer the reader to the appendix. 14
4  Empirical results
4.1  Overview
We focus on what we believe are new findings. We start by exploring graphically the
relationship between various institutions and SWD (section 4.2). The analysis in section
4.3 focuses exclusively on consensus since it is this formal institution that has received
most attention in this context. After that, we turn to quantitative results for more informal
institutions and find that many of them have been unjustly ignored so far.
4.2  A first cut at the role of institutions
Consider first the results from probit regressions on the individual level variables (here
omitting gender because it is never significant; for space reasons we do not report this
regression here but note that personal and national economic performance come out to be
the most significant and important factors). As described in the methodological section
and in the appendix, we then do simulations and obtain predicted values for the
probability of satisfaction. In the graphs below we plot these predictions against an array
of institutional variables. The lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. From these
pictures, it seems to be the case that corporatism and income inequality are relatively
good predictors for satisfaction with democracy. For trust and the rule of law, the
evidence seems to be less clear and as we emphasize later, this suspicion turns out to be
correct since the effect of these two variables comes out as sometimes positive and
sometimes negative, depending on the specification. For consensus, there seems to be a
somewhat positive effect. However, here we can most clearly see that Italy is an outlier
with respect to its citizens’ level of satisfaction with democracy.  15
Figure 1: Probability of satisfaction and institutional variables (all individual
level variables held at their median; results based on 10,000 simulations. Standard
errors/confidence intervals shown as vertical bars).16
While these pictures allow us some first insights, we need to make the analysis more
statistically rigorous by including the institutional variables of interest into the
regressions. Table 1 contains several specifications. First note that also with controlling
for institutional variables, we find that the effects of the individual level variables go in
the expected direction: Losers are generally less satisfied; those who evaluate the national
economic performance positively are more satisfied as are those that judge the
development of their personal economic situation positively; wealthier individuals are
also more satisfied. These three effects also dominate in quantitative terms. We cannot
find robust statistical evidence for political interest, education or age being relevant for
SWD, although several equations appear to suggest that more educated citizens tend to be
less satisfied and that older people tend to be more satisfied. This allows speculations
about the dual character of SWD we mentioned above, namely that SWD is the outcome
of both individual expectations towards democracy (which may be higher for more
educated individuals and lower for people who have experienced democracy longer) and
individual perceptions of the performance of democracy (which may be more critical for
more educated individuals and more positive for older people).  Likelihood ratio tests
confirm that leaving out all institutional variables does worse than including some
combination of them. The hypothesis that the restricted model is indistinguishable from
the unrestricted one (the latter being created by adding one or more institutional
variables) is rejected for each institution considered here at the highest confidence levels
6.
                                                
6 The overall fit of the different specifications can be evaluated by comparing predicted and actual
values. See the appendix.17
Table 1: Binary probit estimation (Dependent variable: 1= satisfied or very
satisfied, 0 = not satisfied or not at all satisfied)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loser -0.377 -0.358 -0.578 -0.588 -0.342 -0.386 -0.406 -0.365
(11.00)** (9.79)** (6.37)** (6.45)** (9.65)** (11.38)** (11.92)** (10.17)**
National Economic  0.265 0.247 0.263 0.260 0.273 0.278 0.267 0.234
Performance (14.96)** (12.98)** (14.91)** (14.74)** (14.90)** (15.88)** (15.15)** (12.39)**
Personal Economic  0.141 0.124 0.144 0.132 0.144 0.145 0.131 0.127
Performance (7.44)** (6.04)** (7.57)** (6.88)** (7.18)** (7.67)** (6.87)** (6.31)**
Political Interest -0.018 -0.005 -0.030 -0.023 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.017
(1.00) (0.23) (1.63) (1.27) (0.69) (0.71) (0.88) (0.86)
Income 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.013 0.015 0.025 0.019
(3.40)** (3.47)** (3.24)** (4.26)** (2.31)* (2.95)** (4.88)** (3.28)**
Education -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(1.08) (1.79) (2.04)* (2.35)* (1.05) (1.50) (1.96) (1.01)
Age 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.84) (0.55) (1.43) (1.49) (1.48) (1.66) (1.80) (1.31)
Corporatism - 0.023 0.035 0.013 - - - 0.023
(3.04)** (3.93)** (1.26) (1.90)
Loser*Corporatism - - 0.024 0.024 - - - -
(2.19)* (2.19)*
Gini (Inequality) - -0.026 - -0.025 - - -0.037 -0.047
(4.55)** (5.23)** (9.48)** (6.31)**
Attitude towards) - 0.212 - - - - - -
change(gradual=high (6.03)**
Trust - -0.005 - - - - - -0.027
(2.28)* (4.94)**
Consensus 0.057 - - - - - - -
(1.78)
Loser*Consens 0.152 - - - - - - -
(3.74)**
Groups - - - - 0.171 - - 1.153
(2.31)* (4.88)**
Rule of law - - - - - 0.089 - -0.157
(5.83)** (4.83)**
Italy -1.288 -1.074 -0.969 -1.032 -1.193 -1.107 -1.107 -1.491
(17.19)** (13.77)** (13.14)** (13.79)** (16.80)** (15.74)** (15.78)** (12.18)**
Constant -0.581 -0.195 -0.812 0.151 -0.747 -1.428 0.513 2.302
(4.42)** (0.77) (6.44)** (0.68) (5.96)** (9.08)** (2.89)** (5.60)**
Observations 6742 5862 6742 6742 6141 6742 6742 6141
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Notes: 1. The long regression with all country dummies but without a constant is omitted for space
reasons. Most dummies are generally significant (exceptions are Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Great
Britain) and take on a value around –0.5 up to –0.7. Italy clearly is an outlier with a value of –1.7.
Similarly, the by country regressions used to create the graphs in section 4.2 are omitted.
2. Gender was only included in the first regression, since it turned out to be quite insignificant
(coefficient 0.02, s.e. 0.03).18
4.3  Quantitative results for consensus
A problem in the existing literature is that scholars have typically stopped short of
making statements about the relative importance of different factors influencing SWD.
Knowing that variable X has a statistically significant impact on SWD does not help the
policymaker judge whether it is worth to change X, if there is no statement about the
relative size of the effect. Scenario analysis can help bring some light to this question.
Consider first the impact of consensual systems on the satisfaction of the “median
citizen”. Since we have argued that losers will benefit more from such a system, we
present the results separately for male median winners and losers (the results are virtually
the same for women).
Figure 2: Minimum and maximum consensus and satisfaction for male median
losers and median winners (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based on
parameter estimates in regression (1)). 
As can be seen from the figure, a loser who is at the median in terms of age, education,
income and his/her perception of national and personal economic performance is19
expected to gain roughly 20-30 percentage points of probability of being satisfied. The
figure also clearly indicates that losers gain more from a consensus system than winners
(we show the results for a change from the minimum value of consensus in the sample
(Great Britain) to the maximum value (Netherlands)). In fact, for winners there is a
relatively big uncertainty as to which way the effect will go. This can be seen from the
overlap of the two kernel plots. 
Having established that consensus is not unambiguously good for SWD overall, we
want to add to the literature by documenting more in depth the quite substantial
interaction between individual and institutional variables. For this purpose, we consider
four scenarios, shown in the next figure
7. 
For example, the best-off female loser (i.e. a woman ranking highest on all individual
level characteristics, shown in the top left panel) has a high probability of being satisfied
under both systems. While the point estimates suggest that a change from a majoritarian
to a consensus system may bring a substantial gain (up to 20 percentage points here,
leading to a probability of being satisfied of 90% instead of 70%) with it, there is a
considerable amount of uncertainty associated with such a change, which is again
indicated by the overlap of the kernel plots.
We find it interesting to consider an extreme case like the one in the lower left corner.
Making losers better off economically and in terms of education (which would bring
them approximately two thirds of the way from the solid kernel plot to the dashed one
                                                
7 Note that while we report results for women and men, since the gender variable is never significant,
this does not amount to much. We just wanted to construct concrete and maybe not unrealistic scenarios.20
(not shown)) and having a more consensual system clearly improves satisfaction with
democracy. The second effect is highlighted separately in the lower right panel. 
By contrast, and plausibly, a person with a strong position in society in terms of
education and income who belongs to the group of winners rather prefers a majoritarian
type of system, which gives him 90% of SWD as opposed to 76%, although there is again
some overlap between the distributions (top right panel).
Figure 3:  Minimum and maximum consensus and satisfaction for four different
types of people (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based on parameter
estimates in regression (1)).22
4.4  Results for informal rules of the “society game”
The second contribution of this paper is that we consider for the first time
systematically – at least to our knowledge – institutional variables other than consensus
and their interaction with individual level variables. The “raw” estimation results in table
1 (columns (2) and (8)) suggest that the institutional variables in general have a
significant effect on SWD, although there are some surprises (like the strongly negative
coefficient for trust). Again, simulation is the method we use to get more interesting and
interpretable results. All the results presented in table 2 and discussed in the following are
based on regression (8) in table 1, unless otherwise stated.23
Table 2 is quite self-explanatory. To understand how to read it, first select a “rule of
the game” of interest. For example, let us consider inequality. Then select one of the three
scenarios in the three columns. For example, take the loser who perceives national
economic performance to be very bad and has all other control variables at their median
(column 1). Then, the table tells us that at the median of inequality in the sample, the
probability of being satisfied is 48%, with a 95% confidence interval between 44% and
52%. By contrast, if inequality is lower, for example only in the first quartile (25%-
Percentile), the probability of being satisfied goes up to 58%. From the minimum to
maximum inequality, SWD decreases by 20%. Thus, inequality is strongly regarded as
being incompatible with the idea that most people have of democracy in Europe. For both
winners and losers, at all levels of personal and economic performance, inequality
substantially decreases satisfaction with democracy (cf. the findings of Alesina (2001)
who reports a relatively high degree of caring for the issue of inequality among
Europeans). 
Secondly, corporatism turns out to be a reliable but not so strong predictor of
satisfaction with democracy as well. For example, ceteris paribus, a maximal increase of
the degree of corporatism (which amounts to quite a system change) increases
satisfaction for losers by 10% on average, whereas winners only gain 5%. The effects of
corporatism and inequality are even stronger when one takes into account that typically
the two variables move in opposite directions (see also the simple correlations in the
appendix). The kernel plot in the following figure shows just that. 24
Figure  4:  Inequality and corporatism (minimum and maximum values) and
satisfaction for the median citizen (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations based
on parameter estimates in regression (2) in table 1).25
Table  2: Predicted probabilities of satisfaction with democracy and first
differences (FD) under different scenarios (10,000 simulations based on regression
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(.78    .85)
FD Min to Max .31
(.19    .42)
.28
(.17    .39)
.24






(.70    .79)
.85
(.81    .88)
Median .48
(.44    .52)
.66
(.63    .69)
.78
(.75    .81)
High 75%-Percentile .43
(.40     .47)
.62
(.59    .64)
.75
( .72    .77)
FD Min to Max -.20
( -.26    -.14)
-.18
( -.22    -.13)
-.14




(.50    .63)
.76
( .72    .80)
.84
(.80    .88)
Median .48
(.44    .52)
.69
(.66     .71)
.78
(.75    .81)
High 75%-Percentile .37
(.34    .41)
.58
(.54    .63)
.69
(.67    .72)
FD Min to Max -.32
(-.44   -.21)
-.30
(-.41   -.19)
-.26
(-.35   -.16)26
Third, in the regression shown here, trust is strongly negatively related to satisfaction
with democracy. This is completely at odds with all predictions. However, we are quick
to emphasize that this happens in this particular specification but not in others. We picked
this one on purpose to show which effects are possible. It is very hard to explain why
groups are so positively (and robustly) related to satisfaction whereas trust is sometimes
positive and sometimes negative. One lesson we draw from this exercise, however, is that
taking individual level factors into account is crucial. Leaving them out of a regression
gives a positive impact of trust always (as found by Anderson (1998)) – but this is a
spurious correlation as we show here. A possible explanation for the ambiguous results
for trust lies in its potential to increase rent-seeking in a society (Schneider and Wagner
2001). 
By contrast, the degree to which a society fosters group memberships of its members
is almost always significantly related to satisfaction with democracy. Here, a jump from
the 25
th percentile to the median boosts satisfaction of the loser with a dark perception of
national economic performance by 15% points. Here we have a clear policy implication:
fostering the degree to which people engage in social interactions improves their support
of the regime per se. This is related to arguments of Putnam (1993).
Finally, and equally surprisingly, the rule of law actually has a small but significant
negative impact on satisfaction with democracy. The effect is stronger for losers (up to
minus 12 percentage points) than for winners (up to minus 8 percentage points). Again,
however, we note that in alternative specifications other results arise. Table 1 reports a
regression, for example, which gives a positive coefficient on the rule of law (regression
(5)). The most we can say for this institution is that its effect on SWD is not clear. 27
5  Conclusion and policy implications
A first major policy message is that, much as there exists no economic project that is
truly Pareto-improving, there also exists virtually no policy to improve everybody’s
satisfaction with democracy (SWD). A consensual system generally promotes
satisfaction, but one needs to distinguish different types of citizens. Losers, poorer and
less educated people gain in terms of satisfaction with democracy when a consensual
system is present. Our findings lead us to reject the hypothesis that a consensus system is
unambiguously better able to provide high degrees of satisfaction of the population than a
majoritarian system.
Second, we present evidence for the role other institutions and rules of the game in a
society play for SWD. We find that corporatism and group membership as a measure of
social capital are good for satisfaction. By contrast people who live in countries with a
high degree of income inequality tend to be less satisfied. The findings for trust and the
rule of law are ambiguous. 
We interpret the lack of unambiguous results for some institutions as corresponding to
different expectations of citizens in different countries. Conversely, one should be careful
in demanding, say “more corporatism” too fast. Thus, while our empirical results are
interesting, they also point to a severe shortcoming in the theory of satisfaction with
democracy. The theory that provides a convincing account of ideals of democracy as
related to perceptions of its actual workings together with the two apparently most
important dimensions of institutions, conflict management potential and efficiency,
remains to be written. We regard this as the big challenge for future research.28
6  Appendix
6.1  Descriptive statistics and data sources
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Satisfaction with democracy .613 .481 0 1
Loser .556 .501 0 1
National economic performance (NatEc) 2.760 1.038 1 5
Personal economic performance (PerEc) 2.964 .947 1 5
Interest in politics 2.416 .932 1 4
Income (categorical) 6.831 3.544 1 12
Years of education 17.215 5.138 6 98
Age 45.210 16.994 15 99
Sex 1.492 .50 1 2
Attitude towards social change 2.206 .520 0 3
Consens -.0920 .813 -1.56 1.08
Loser*Consens -.065 .598 -1.56 1.08
Trust 35.961 10.090 21.4 52.7
Corporatism 7.808 3.240 4 14
Loser*Corporatism 4.309 4.575 0 14
Gini (Inquality) 30.472 4.412 24.34 37.67
Rule of law 8.755 1.117 6.18 10
Data used for the tables in the main part of the paper are generally from the Eurobarometer 34.2 (1990).
Data on corporatism (social partnership) is from Tarantelli (1986), data on trust from the World Values
Surveys as reported by Knack and Keefer (1997), data on income inequality (GINI) from Deininger and
Squire (1996), Consensus vs. majoritarian democracy from Lijphart (1994), the rule of law from Wagner
(2001) who describes the primary source. Data on governments is from
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm. LOCORP=LOSER*CORPO.
LOCON=LOSER*CONSENS. Most of the individual level variables are self-explanatory. Loser was
defined as 1 if the person had not voted for a party that was in the government at the time of the survey.
Attitude towards social change is 3 if the person prefers gradual change, and 1 if the person believes that
“we need a revolution.” Higher income categories earn more. People with a value of 4 on interest with
politics are very interested, those with a value of 1 are not interested at all. Both personal and national
economic performance refer to the change over the past 12 months and have higher values if the person
said her or his situation got “better”. Gender is coded such that 2=woman, 1=man. Gini is higher for more
unequal countries. The rule of law index is higher in more orderly societies.
Correlation between the institutional variables
Consens Trust Corporatism Gini Rule of law Groups
Consens 1.0000
Trust 0.0711 1.0000
Corp. 0.4283 0.3033 1.0000
Gini -0.2734 -0.2136 -0.5501 1.0000
Rulelaw 0.4424 0.3460 0.7207 -0.4038 1.0000
Groups 0.3281 0.8187 0.3630 -0.0471 0.3780 1.000029
6.2  Overall fit of the models
The figures shown here reveal that neither of the specifications is really superior to the
others. All of them produce reasonable good overall fits, with no systematic over- or
underprediction, but with a few outlier predictions every now and then. It is important to
realize that these figures do not tell us, say, whether the consensus variable is more
important or other institutional variables are. 
In the graphs, “Model A” refers to a specification with consensus as the institutional
variable, whereas “Model B” is a specification with corporatism.
Figure 5: Goodness of fit in two specifications
The predicted probabilities of satisfaction with democracy were sorted into 150
intervals by size. For each interval, the average probability of satisfaction is plotted on
the y-axis against the average prediction on the x-axis. The closer the circles (which
indicate the number of observations in that particular “bin”) are to the 45 degree line, the
better the fit. 30
6.3   Simulation technique
Recall that the probit model can be expressed with two core equations (King 1998):
(,) i Yf θα =  and  ( , ) i gX θβ =  where the first equation indicates that the dependent
variable is drawn from  ( , ) f θα, i.e. the stylized normal distribution in the present case.θ
represents the features that vary across observations (modeled here as a linear term  i X β ),
while  α  is a set of ancillary parameters (the threshold parameter τ  is set to zero for
convenience). Now, consider the following procedure: First, specify a “scenario”, i.e. a
vector of values for the explanatory variables that we are interested in. Second, draw m
sets of estimated parameters from the multivariate normal distribution, which takes as
inputs the estimated coefficients from the regressions and their variance-covariance
matrix. The multivariate normal distribution is appropriate since a Central Limit Theorem
holds. Third, use these simulated parameters and the scenario vector to calculate m
values of  i X θβ = . Since for the present model, this also gives the expected value, these
values can directly be used to learn something about mean predictions of satisfaction with
democracy (including confidence intervals), first differences and other quantities of
interest. An intuitive way of characterizing effects of institutions on democracy are so-
called kernel plots, i.e. smoothed histograms based on many expected values. In that case,
the vertical axis reports the frequency of a given predicted value
8. All simulations and
plots are based on 10,000 simulations. For all the simulations in section 4.3, we set the
                                                
8 We choose to report absolute frequencies because this seems to us to be a better way to think that we
actually are interested in individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. These can easily be transformed into
relative frequencies.31
Italy dummy equal to zero. This means that the results should be interpreted as pertaining
to all countries except Italy. Leaving out all observations for Italy in the first place does
not affect the results.
6.4  Robustness tests
We have considered several robustness tests of our calculations. Most importantly, in
many different specifications (for example, dropping one of the demographic variables at
a time, adding additional variables like unemployment or actual GDP growth), the
direction of the effects remains the same (including the ambiguity of results for trust and
the rule of law). Of course, the magnitude of the effects is different. But the differences
are small and thus do not warrant a further discussion here. We have also experimented
with different Eurobarometer datasets. Unfortunately, not all the same questions were
asked in the same Eurobarometers. The same items are available for only a few
Eurobarometers. The substantive results remain robust when we use Eurobarometer 42
instead. Applying a logit instead of a probit setup does not change the substantive results.
Including more country dummies in addition to Italy does not alter the qualitative results.
Neither does leaving out all observations pertaining to Italy; the consensus variable gets a
slightly stronger positive effect then, though. In quantitative terms, the effect of
consensual systems are less pronounced for most types of individuals considered (except
for the worst-off female). By contrast, the predicted first differences of changes in
national economic performance evaluations and personal economic well-being are bigger
by between 0.02 and 0.04 percentage points. Finally, the substantive conclusions are not
altered when we consider an ordered probit model, as can be seen from the following
figures.32
Figure 6: Minimum and maximum consensus and degree of satisfaction for four
different types of people (smooth histogram from 10,000 simulations from ordered
probit regression).33
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